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Is International Law a Hartian Legal System? 
Abstract 
 
H.L.A. Hart proposed one of the most influential accounts of law, according to which law is a 
union of primary rules, which guide the behavior of the law’s subjects, and secondary rules, 
which guide officials in recognizing, changing and interpreting primary rules. Writing at the end 
of the 1950s, Hart had serious doubts that international law meets the necessary criteria for a 
legal system.  But there are several reasons to reconsider his position. One is that international 
law grew significantly since then. But a more important reason is that Hart provided an 
oversimplified description of the necessary and sufficient conditions for law provided by his 
account, and therefore of the nature of the international legal order.  A proper understanding of 
Hart’s view gives us a richer and more accurate understanding of the essential features of law, 
but also a less precise yardstick by which to measure and characterize the character of various 
systems of rules, including international law. According to this new yardstick, international law 
fails to meet the criteria for a Hartian legal system, but for different reasons than Hart identified. 
 










The authority of international law depends in part on whether it has features that make it 
worthy of the name of law. Law-worthiness has been traditionally associated with the existence 
of a sovereign powerful enough to demand obedience (Thomas Hobbes, John Austin), with the 
close alignment of legal rules with basic moral requirements (John Finnis), or with structural 
features of the set of rules which guide behavior. 1 
H.L.A. Hart proposed this last view, which is now considered one of the most influential 
accounts of law. Law is a union of primary rules, which guide the behavior of the law’s subjects, 
and secondary rules, which guide officials in recognizing, changing, and interpreting primary 
rules. Law is thus technically best understood as a legal system in which secondary rules serve in 
the identification of primary rules. The parsimony of this account is attractive. To ascertain 
whether a set of rules counts as law, we evaluate whether primary rules are generally obeyed, 
and whether secondary rules of change and adjudication serve for the public officials’ 
recognition and application of primary rules. These two criteria for the identification of law 
enable us to evaluate legal orders, including international law, with a relatively small and precise 
set of tools.  
Hart believed that there are many examples of legal systems that meet his two criteria, 
and the law of many advanced democracies certainly do. However, he considered international 
law to be in a twilight area. Writing at the end of the 1950s (his Concept of Law was published in 
1961), Hart had serious doubts that it meets the necessary criteria for a legal system.  Indeed, 
several times in the book he likened international law to primitive legal systems, which were not 
                                                            
1 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, ed. Edwin Curley (Hackett 
Pub Co, 1994); John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Memphis, TN: General Books LLC, 
2012); John Finnis, Natural Law And Natural Rights, 2 edition (New York: Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 2011); 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Leslie Green, 3rd. edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University 
Press, USA, 2012). 
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fully grown legal orders, since for the most part they lacked secondary rules.2 But there are 
several reasons to reconsider his position. One is that international law grew significantly since 
then. But a more important reason is that Hart provided an oversimplified description of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for law provided by his account, and therefore of the nature 
of the international legal order. Hart analysis of international law was doubly misleading. By 
denying the existence of an international rule of recognition, he may have mischaracterized the 
nature of an international legal order in which such a rule was already operating at the time his 
view was taking shape, but also the necessary features international law must meet in order to 
qualify as a legal system.  
I will argue that Hart overstated the simplicity of his account of law, and that ultimately, 
ascertaining whether international law meets Hart’s criteria for a legal system is a much more 
laborious exercise. The point of the argument is not to raise questions about need to better 
understand international law, but to cast doubts on whether parsimonious accounts are possible 
and desirable given the complexity of legal orders. International law is an especially suitable test 
case for this hypothesis as it unsettles many of the preconceptions we might develop about the 
paradigmatic cases of law derived from national legal systems. 
This reconsideration of Hart’s account carries a high theoretical payoff. Hart’s concepts 
for describing and understanding law are now part of the shared vocabulary of scholars of law 
and legal theory. Moreover, his criteria capture plausible features of the law  ̶  systematicity, 
internal validity, acceptance by subjects  ̶  and whether these features are sufficient as a test for 
any system of laws is worth investigating.3 But the practical importance of this exercise is no less 
salient.  Whether a rule is part of a legal system speaks to its validity, and thus, indirectly, to the 
                                                            
2 Hart, The Concept of Law, 4–5. 
3 Leslie Green, “The Concept of Law Revisited,” ed. H. L. A. Hart, Michigan Law Review 94, no. 6 (1996): 1688. 
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subjects’ evaluation of whether it is a rule that is binding on them. Hart’s project was positivist, 
preoccupied with identifying the descriptive features of law, and not the moral authority of the 
law, or the reasons the subjects may have to comply with its requirements. Yet although the 
positivist and the normative project are distinct, they are related. That is, whether a group a rules 
has the character of a legal system may offer one, although not the only, reason for the 
addressees of the rules to see them as binding.4 The proof that international law has the features 
of a legal system may offer its subjects  ̶  states, individuals, organizations  ̶  an additional reason 
for acting in compliance with its demands.5 
 It is no surprise then that scholars who in recent years have engaged with Hart’s view on 
international law have been misled by his account.  Jeremy Waldron, Samantha Besson, and 
Mehrdad Payandeh have sought to vindicate the place of international law in the pantheon of 
Hartian legal systems.6 However, these scholars have underestimated the complexity of Hart’s 
criteria and the implication of this complexity for assessing the character of international law. In 
particular, they have used the existence of a rule of recognition in international law as a reason to 
cast doubt on Hart’s view that international law is not a legal system. My argument extends and 
deepens these analyses to give us a better picture both of Hart’s account and the place of 
international law within it. It shows that even if international law does contain a rule of 
                                                            
4 It is important to emphasize that most legal positivists see these two aspects of the law, validity and authority, as 
distinct, as John Gardner clearly points out in his “Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths,” The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 46, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 204–7. However, it is likely they are tightly connected in the eyes of the 
general public, i.e. the law’s subjects.  
5 By dismissing international law as not quite worthy of being called law in the technical sense, Hart himself might 
have given the impression that it is not worth studying and understanding. Mehrdad Payandeh, “The Concept of 
International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart,” European Journal of International Law 21, no. 4 (2010): 
978–79, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’, in M.H. Kramer et al. (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. 
Hart (2008), at 67, 68–69. 
6 Jeremy Waldron, “International Law: ‘A Relatively Small and Unimportant’ Part of Jurisprudence?” in Reading 
HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law, L. Duarte d’Alemida, J. Edwards, and A. Dolcetti eds., (Bloomsbury 2013), 
Samantha Besson, “Theorizing the Sources of International Law,” in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. 
Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford University Press, 2010); Mehrdad Payandeh, “The Concept of 
International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart.” 
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recognition, it fails as a legal system when measured against other implicit features of Hart’s 
account of law.  
 The purpose of interpreting international law through a Hartian lens is trifold: 1. To 
reveal important features of Harts account of law that he himself left in the background of his 
definition, 2. To better understand the nature of international law in light of Hart’s reconstructed 
view, and 3. To turn a mirror on our view of law stemming from centralized, hierarchical models 
of law-making. A proper understanding of Hart’s view gives us a richer and more accurate 
account of the nature of law, but also a less precise yardstick by which to measure and 
characterize the nature of various systems of rules, including international law. According to this 
new yardstick, international law is neither a primitive legal order, as Hart maintained, nor a full 
blown legal system, but occupies an indeterminate place in between these two opposing 
categories. I will show that Hart was right that international law does not meet the conditions for 
a legal system, but not for the reasons he identified. 
 In the next section I will demonstrate that the two minimum conditions which describe 
the union of primary and secondary rules are in fact a series of multiple interdependent 
conditions in which the functions performed by different secondary rules can be clearly 
differentiated and may not be found together in legal orders. The following section will show 
how, at different points in the book, Hart clearly defends the existence of other essential 
characteristics of law besides the two explicitly mentioned in his definition of law. By 
excavating and making explicit these other characteristics, we will gain a richer and more 
accurate picture of the nature of law. The final section will apply this reconstructed Hartian 
account of law to international law to show that Hart was right about the incompleteness of the 
international legal system, but not for the reasons he identified. 
6 
 
A. Two ‘Minimal Conditions’ 
 
Hart’s definition of law pithily captures the core of his view:  
 
‘There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behavior which are valid according to the 
system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and on the other hand, its 
rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication, must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official 
behavior by its officials.’7  
 
Hart believed that we can best explain the nature of the law as a collection of rules of 
varying types and purposes that stand in a special relationship to each other. The most important 
condition, in Hart’s view, was the union of primary and secondary rules: for there to be a legal 
system and not merely a collection of separate standards of behavior, primary rules must be 
supplemented by secondary rules enabling the subjects to discern between valid and invalid 
rules. Adding such secondary rules is what is necessary ‘to convert the regime of primary rules 
into what is indisputably a legal system.’8 Most readers will be tempted to take the presence of 
primary and secondary rules as an exclusive test to identify legal maturity in marginal cases such 
as international law. However, I will show that while these conditions may be necessary for the 
identification of a legal system, they cannot be sufficient, despite Hart’s insistence to the 
contrary.  
                                                            
7 Hart, The Concept of Law, 116, emphasis mine. 
8 Hart, 94. 
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I will start first by showing in this section that this deceptively simple description of the 
union of primary and secondary rules masks the presence of multiple and independently 
necessary conditions. According to Hart, secondary rules of recognition serve the ‘conclusive 
identification of primary rules of obligation.’9 The existence of rules of recognition is the most 
important criteria of legal validity, and without them we lack the unity necessary for a group of 
legal rules to form a system. All rules of recognition in a legal system culminate in the ultimate 
rule of recognition, which is primarily a social rule that identifies a legal document such as a 
constitution or a practice such as monarchical succession as the origin of all legal rules valid in a 
particular legal system. Variously described as a custom, convention, or social practice followed 
by most of the law’s officials, the ultimate rule of recognition is at the basis of all legal 
systems.10 For Hart, the existence of rules of recognition is what distinguishes primitive law, 
such as the law of tribal societies or international law, which he also characterized as primitive, 
from developed legal systems.  
However, as Leslie Green pointed out, it is likely that the difference that Hart stipulated 
between societies with primitive law and advanced legal system is one of degree and not of kind, 
reflecting the extent of complexity and institutionalization of secondary norms.11 Indeed, I will 
argue that no society can function without a tacit or explicit recognition of the authority or 
authorities with the legitimacy to make law and require obedience. In developed legal system, 
rules of recognition are elaborate and numerous, pointing to social norms, legal practices such as 
enactments by legislatures and judicial precedents, and foundational, constitutive documents as 
                                                            
9 Hart, 95. 
10 For some difficulties about whether the rule of recognition should be best understood as a conventional rule see 
Leslie Green, “Positivism and Conventionalism,” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 12 (1999): 37–39; 
and Andrei Marmor, “Legal Conventionalism,” Legal Theory 4, no. 4 (1998): 509–31. 
11 Green, “The Concept of Law Revisited,” 1699. 
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sources of law, whereas in developing legal systems such rules are mostly implicit and not well-
articulated.12 I will return to this point below to show that international law has long had implicit 
rules of recognition, and that a set of rules creating legal obligations for states could not have 
operated without one. 
 Another important set of secondary rules are the rules of change, whose main purpose is 
to empower a legal agent to introduce new rules or to modify and repeal old ones.13 The third set 
of secondary rules are those enabling the authoritative settlement of disputes, called rules of 
adjudication.14 They will typically empower institutions such as courts, individual roles such as 
judges, procedures, and jurisdictions in a legal system. The rules of recognition, change and 
adjudication are connected on many levels. For example, when courts are empowered to make 
judgments about whether the law has been broken, they are also invested with the power 
interpret and define the law, and thus rules of adjudication often form part of a general rule of 
recognition.15  
But, importantly, secondary rules need not develop together, and it is possible to have 
legal orders which contain some secondary rules while others are missing. For example, it is 
possible to have communities guided solely according to customary systems of rules, without 
legislatures, and therefore without rules of change, but with rules of adjudication that enable the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. There will be rules of recognition in such a community pointing 
to custom as the main source of law, but not to legislative assemblies as sources of law. So too, it 
is possible to have legal orders where the rules of recognition and change are well developed and 
institutionalized, but the rules of adjudication are absent or weakly institutionalized. Secondary 
                                                            
12 Hart, The Concept of Law, 101. 
13 Hart, 95. 
14 Hart, 97. 
15 Hart, 97. 
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rules are not logically connected and they may develop at different rates even in the legal 
practices of mature societies.   
 Hart would likely not consider legal orders with partial or partially developed secondary 
rules as legal system proper, as some of the contrasts he draws between primitive legal orders 
and fully fledged legal systems show. For example, he claims that communities lacking rules of 
adjudication will be marred by pervasive uncertainties about the meaning and scope of 
application of the law, and inefficiencies in their application, while societies without rules of 
change will tend to be static. Uncertainty, ineffectiveness, and stasis are characteristics of 
primitive societies.16 The implication of this differentiation of secondary rules according to their 
function is that they are individually necessary for the existence of a legal system, as a legal 
system for example lacks rules of adjudication would not be a proper legal system. 
It is not just the presence of individuated secondary norms that is important, but their 
acceptance by officials, which must form part of a common and uniform shared practice, in the 
sense that most of the society’s legal officials will refer to the same secondary rules as directing 
their behavior. But what counts as habitual obedience is difficult to specify. Hart insisted that in 
functioning legal orders most of the rules are ‘most often obeyed than disobeyed by most of 
those affected,’ and the obedience of the subjects is explained by a variety of reasons, including 
coercion, social pressure, or an attitude of acceptance of the behavioral guidelines of the law. 
Habitual obedience as a condition of law is a feature that Hart borrows from Austin, but Hart 
does not add greater precision than Austin did to the issue of how to distinguish legal orders 
characterized by habitual obedience from those we do not. ‘Habitual obedience’ remained for 
Hart, as it did for Austin, a ‘vague and imprecise notion.’17 This vagueness becomes especially 
                                                            
16 Hart, 91–93. 
17 Hart, 23–24. 
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salient for assessing the status of other systems of law, such as international law, where at the 
margin, it matters whether we judge primary and secondary rules to be accepted and obeyed. 
These complications aside, Hart’s own description of the two minimal conditions 
obscures the significant complexity of his criteria. His two minimal conditions can be broken 
into six empirical and formal criteria for the identification of a legal system: 1. the existence of 
primary rules, which 2. are habitually obeyed by the population, and 3. the existence of rules of 
recognition, 4. rules of change, and 5. rules of adjudication, which 6. are accepted as common 
public standards by public officials. It is logically and empirically possible that a group of legal 
rules meet some but not all these criteria, especially systems that are evolving from embryonic 
ones, and international law may be such a case. For example, international law may have rule of 
recognition but no commonly accepted standards of adjudication for rule violations. In addition, 
condition 5 and 6 require 7. namely that there are at least some courts with compulsory 
jurisdiction, and 8. that such jurisdiction must be effective, that is, their judgments must be 
obeyed and be enforced coercively in the case of non-compliance. Rules 4 and 6 require the 
existence of 9. rule-making and rule-changing bodies, such as a legislature. Therefore, we cannot 
take Hart’s claim that there are only two necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
a legal system at face value.  
David Lefkowitz emphasizes a similar point: Hart overstated the simplicity of his account 
in one crucial respect, namely by failing to distinguish between the ‘absence or presence of 
secondary rules tout court,’ and ‘the absence of presence of a division of labor in identifying, 
altering, applying and enforcing.’ 18 What Lefkowitz means is that Hart failed to identify as 
necessary conditions of law both the presence of primary and secondary rules and the presence 
                                                            
18 David Lefkowitz, “What Makes Social Order Primitive? In Defense of Hart’s Take on International Law” 
forthcoming, Legal Philosophy, 2018 pp. 4, 17 (article manuscript pagination). 
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of institutions such as courts and legislatures that interpret, apply, and enforce these rules. The 
ultimate rule of recognition identifies not only a set of rules arranges in a certain relationship 
with each other, but also a hierarchy of official bodies carrying out the functions defined by the 
secondary rules, such as legislatures and courts.  
 My analysis above is in line with this observation. The ultimate rule of recognition hides 
the diversity of rules and institutions necessary in complex legal orders. But it also obscures the 
presence of additional criteria for the identification of a legal system. Yet, before we move on to 
these additional criteria, it is worth dwelling on the ultimate rule of recognition, whose existence 
Hart denied in the case of international law. The ultimate rule of recognition is the rule that 
explains the validity of all other rules within a system and it is of foundational importance. The 
rule of recognition is usually unstated, and can be identified or ‘shown’ in the way in which 
primary rules are recognized by officials.19 The use of ‘unstated’ rules of recognition is 
characteristic of the internal point of view.20 The internal point of view shows that rules are 
accepted as standards of behavior and as reasons to act in the ways required by them. Those who 
adopt the internal point of view take the rules to impose obligations and to serve as the ‘basis for 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment.’21  
The more Hart explains the role of the rule of recognition, the more it becomes clear that 
any society with rules, even primitive ones have rules of recognition. Indeed, any such society 
must display the ‘complex social situation where a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and 
used for the identification of primary rules of obligation,’ without which it could not function as 
a society held together by rules habitually obeyed by most inhabitants.22 To habitually obey the 
                                                            
19 Hart, 101. 
20 Hart, 102. 
21 Hart, 89–90. 
22 Hart, 100. 
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rules, the inhabitants must be able to identify, either via implicit or explicit secondary rules, how 
they are to distinguish the rules of obligations that apply to them. Therefore, the rule of 
recognition is not something that distinguishes primitive from developed legal systems, although 
it serves to set apart Hart’s conception of law from that of Austin, who identified law with 
habitual obedience of a sovereign who habitually obeys no one.  
 The foundational rule of recognition has other features. It is ultimate and supreme, in the 
sense that it derives its validity from no other rule, but only from the general social practice that 
shows its acceptance by the relevant officials, and is supreme because it is at the highest point of 
a hierarchy that determines the order or precedence between various sources of law.23 The rule of 
recognition can contain multiple criteria for identifying the sources of law, which can conflict 
with each other (statutes enacted by a legislature can conflict with the constitution), and while 
the rule of recognition does not resolve all such conflicts, it establishes a general order of 
precedence that help produce a final adjudication (at least final in the sense allowed by the 
institutional procedures internal to the legal system) in each particular case of conflict. Hart 
identified the lack of an ultimate rule of recognition as a fundamental incompleteness in a legal 
system, and considered it one of the main reasons that disqualified international law as a legal 
system.  
 
B. Additional Conditions for the Existence of a Legal System. 
 
So far, I have shown that Hart’s ‘two minimum conditions’ are in fact more properly 
understood as nine conditions, and there are additional reasons to believe that Hart left out of his 
                                                            
23 Hart, 105–10. 
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characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a legal system other features that 
elsewhere he claims are essential. The most important reason to believe that these initial 
conditions describing the union of primary and secondary rules are not sufficient is that they fail 
to set apart legal systems from other systems of rules governing complex social practices. 
Football and tennis associations have primary rules that direct the behavior of the participants in 
the practice, and governing bodies which identify and interpret the rules and change them 
according to secondary rules. Churches, universities, and companies also have primary and 
secondary rules that guide the behavior of their members without constituting what we common 
refer to as ‘law.’ Leslie Green has observed as much in his introduction to Hart’s Concept of Law 
when he said that given that the union of primary and secondary rules does not set apart sports 
leagues and law, ‘there is no question of having a ‘formal’ test for legal system.’24 
 Hart may have misled readers when he declared these two conditions to be sufficient, and 
he provided ample opportunity to doubt this simplified characterization of law and resources to 
build a richer, more realistic account of law throughout the book. The first important clue that 
there are other essential elements of law comes from his criticism of the command theory of law. 
The command theory of law is characterized by the fact that an agent  ̶  the sovereign in Austin’s 
case  ̶  issues orders that must be obeyed on penalty of coercive reprisal or threat of such 
reprisal.25  Hart points out several fatal flaws of this account. In contrast to a simple command, 
law issues general directives for behavior. Law is ‘general in two ways: it indicates a general 
type of conduct and applies to a general class of persons who are expected to see that it applies to 
them and to comply with it.’26 The generality of the rules in this double sense is thus an essential 
                                                            
24 Leslie Green, ‘Introduction,’ The Concept of Law, xxv. 
25 Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 36. 
26 Hart, The Concept of Law, 21. 
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feature of the law. For states, general laws ‘extend to all persons in its territorial boundaries.’27 
Generality need not be a feature of all areas of law, although Hart was not explicit on this point. 
For certain areas of law, the requirement of generality if very strong, such as for criminal law, 
which is paradigmatic of coercive orders backed by threats. But laws can be addressed to specific 
social roles (parents) or professions (lawyers) without applying to all of the persons in a state’s 
territory. Generality is a feature of legal system that distinguishes them from other social 
practices such as those of a tennis association. 
Hart mounted other important criticisms of John Austin theory of law which are less 
important for our present purposes, so a brief outline will suffice.28 According to Hart, Austin’s 
‘command theory’ of the law was inadequate on a number of other fronts: it does not explain the 
sense of obligation often espoused by the law’s subjects  ̶  what Hart called the internal point of 
view  ̶  it lacks an explanation of the continuity of law in the case of a change in sovereign, and it 
fails to explain a range of legal rules which can neither be properly called commands, nor are 
backed by sanctions. Power-conferring rules, such as the rules for the making of contracts, wills, 
and marriages, or the rules conferring judicial powers, are rules whose violations result in the 
nullity of the act, which is not best understood as a sanction in the same way as fines or 
imprisonment are.29 
Hart did grant however two additional important features of Austin’s account that have 
been left out of his identification of law with the two ‘necessary and sufficient’ conditions. One 
is that law must contain a coercive element, and this sets it apart law from social rules and 
                                                            
27 Hart, 21. 
28 Green, “The Concept of Law Revisited,” 1693. 
29 Hart, The Concept of Law, 27–35. For Hart, power-conferring rules were best understood not as laws backed by 
sanctions, but laws whose consequence, if broken, would be nullity of the act undertaken. So failure to follow 
contract laws would render the contact void and null, and nullity is not a sanction. See especially pp. 29-30 where 
Hart discusses nullity. Contract laws also have provisions that are backed by sanctions, but the core of the power-
conferring rules is not the sanction element, which distinguishes it from the rules of criminal law. 
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morality. Indeed, he claims that this is a feature people often associate with law and not other 
systems of social rules, and that this association is correct: ‘In the case of legal rules it is very 
often held that the crucial difference (the element of ‘must’ and ‘ought’) consists in the fact that 
deviations from certain types of behavior will probably meet with hostile reactions, and in the 
case of legal rules be punished by officials.’ Even though he rejects predictive accounts of law, 
Hart goes on to say: ‘It is obvious that predictability of punishment is one important aspect of 
legal rules.’30 He emphasizes this point again when he claims the necessity of coercion in 
connection to adjudication of disputes. Legal systems need agencies ‘empowered to ascertain 
finally and authoritatively, the fact of violations,’ which is best understood as requiring courts 
with compulsory jurisdiction. Additionally, rather than leaving punishment to the individuals 
affected, a specialized agency for enforcement would also be needed, suggesting that centralized 
enforcement is another necessary feature of a legal system.31 
 Coercion indeed is essential to law if we are to distinguish legal rules from other types of 
social rules that purport to guide behavior: rules of etiquette, language, and even morality. But 
coercion is not a necessary feature of all areas of law, as Hart rightly emphasized. Legal rules are 
an important subset of social rules which are sometimes made by legislature, and sometimes 
come into existence as customs. Some rules mandate behavior, others indicate ‘what people 
should do to give effect to the wishes they have.’32 The former are rules most commonly 
associated with the criminal law, and the latter are power-conferring rules. The existence of 
power-conferring rules means for Hart that law does not rest primarily, or even essentially, on 
                                                            
30 Hart, 11. 
31 Hart, 93–94. 
32 Hart, 9. 
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coercion. Like Austin, Hart believed coercion is an essential feature of the law, but unlike 
Austin, he did not believe that coercion is a feature that attaches to all legal rules.33  
 Hart emphasized additional features that distinguish legal rules form other social rules. 
While persistence, generality, and the presence of coercive sanctions, characterize formal and 
institutional features of the law, he said that legal rules are also distinguished by their content. 
Any law worthy of the name must contain ‘restrictions on the free use of violence, theft, and 
deception,’ along with other rules imposing positive duties on individuals to contribute to the 
common life.34 And these restrictions must apply generally: ‘where there is law, there human 
conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory,’ so that no individual subject has 
absolute freedom over her own actions.35 The existence of laws that restrict the use of violence, 
theft and deception are typically associated with criminal law, and any legal system will contain 
provisions that criminalize behaviors that are especially injurious to individuals and that preserve 
the basis of their peaceful social interaction. This will be especially relevant for evaluating 
international law, whose criminal law dimension is only beginning to crystalize.  
 We have thus far identified at least three additional conditions that a system of rules must 
meet in order to qualify as law in addition to the nine I have identified earlier: 10. the generality 
of the rules both in terms of their content and range of applicability (to all the subjects within a 
given territory), 11. the presence of rules that criminalize certain types of behavior injurious to 
individual life and liberty and to the social life of the community, and 12. the presence of 
coercive punishment as a response to rule violation. Criminal law emerges as an essential 
component of a legal system that best captures all of these three conditions. The rules governing 
                                                            
33 Hart, 10–11. 
34 Hart, 91. 
35 Hart, 82. 
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physical violence, theft and deception must designate general categories of action that are 
proscribed, they apply generally to all inhabitants of a territory, and come attached to coercive 
sanctions for their non-observance.  
Rule 8 already contains the necessity of coercive enforcement, but only in the case of 
non-compliance with the judgments of courts, so we can combine 8 and 12 to retain 11 
conditions in all. I do not claim to have identified a complete and comprehensive list of all of the 
conditions that Hart discusses, so the question of whether my list identifies all the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the existence of law is less important. What I showed is that Hart’s 
criteria are significantly more numerous than he lets on, and I have pointed out some of the more 
plausible formal, empirical, and substantive requirements for the existence of law not captured 
by his definition.  
Hart’s obfuscation of the necessary conditions for the existence of a legal system is an 
understandable failure of his effort to boil down into ‘minimal conditions’ what is fundamentally 
a complex social phenomenon that resist easy schematization. By reducing the criteria for the 
existence of legal system to ‘two’ conditions, Hart conceals additional formal and substantive 
criteria implied in his characterization of the nature of law. These additional criteria are no less 
important for identifying legal systems that the two minimal criteria that Hart explicitly mentions 
as ‘necessary and sufficient’ conditions. For example, it is unlikely that Hart will describe a set 
of rules as a legal system if it contains rules of recognition that are widely accepted as common 
practice but no rules of adjudication. Also unlikely is that Hart will designate as legal system sets 
of laws that contain no primary rules making certain kinds of conduct obligatory for all, or 
general rules criminalizing certain behaviors but no enforcement. This finer-grained description 




C. Is International Law a Hartian Legal System? 
 
In the much-criticized chapter X of his book, Hart takes up the question of whether 
international law is law properly so called, by which he meant a legal system that met his 
necessary and sufficient conditions.36 Hart is not so much interested in policing the use of the 
word ‘law,’ and is perfectly comfortable to refer to international law as law, acknowledging the 
fact that in ordinary language the words ‘law’ and ‘legal system’ may be used more loosely. But 
he is interested to ascertain whether on the stricter, more technical conception of law that he 
deploys, international law falls short, and he argues that it does. 37 I will now provide the final 
step in the argument to show that Hart was likely right in his judgment, but not for the reasons 
that he puts forward.  
Hart’s main reason for refusing to grant international law the status of legal system was 
that in his view, international law was only a ‘set of separate primary rules of obligation which 
are not united,’ lacking the most important feature of a unitary system, that of an ultimate rule of 
recognition.38 The union of primary and secondary rules in international law is as necessary as in 
domestic law because it distinguishes law as a means of social control from two ‘juristic 
                                                            
36 Waldron for instance called it ‘an embarrassing chapter,’ and claimed that it displayed ‘a frustrating combination 
of insight and obtuseness.’ Jeremy Waldron, “International Law: ‘A Relatively Small and Unimportant’ Part of 
Jurisprudence?” 209. 
37 Mehrdad Payandeh says that Hart denies that the existence of a rule of recognition is a necessary condition for 
international law. I think this is a misreading of Hart. Payandeh is right that Hart believes international law can be 
called law, however he makes this claim in the context of distinguishing between looser and more precise ways to 
use the word ‘law.’ As a descriptive term ‘law’ is used in different ways, and there are acceptable uses to describe 
the system of international norms. But when it comes to identifying law with a Hartian legal system, Harts makes it 
clear that the rule of recognition must be present. Mehrdad Payandeh, “The Concept of International Law in the 
Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart,” 977; Hart, The Concept of Law, 213–14. 
38 Hart, 233. 
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extremes:’ orders backed by threats and rules of morality.39 Waldron, Payandeh, and others have 
gone to considerable lengths to challenge Hart on this point, but they have failed to distinguish 
the fact that Hart makes both a conceptual and an empirical claim.40 The conceptual claim is that 
primary legal rules can exist without a basic rule of recognition. The empirical claim is that 
international law lacks such a rule: ‘but it is submitted that there is no basic rule providing 
general criteria of validity for the rules of international law, and that the rules which are in fact 
operative constitute not a system but a set of rules.’41 Hart is wrong on both the conceptual and 
empirical claim. For he is wrong that a basic rule of recognition is not necessary for the operation 
of a complex legal system such as international law, and he is also wrong that it cannot be 
observed empirically as a shared set of social practices that guide the identification of valid rules 
within the system by the system’s officials. Hart does leave open the possibility that international 
law may be in transition to a system that relies on a rule of recognition. But in denying the 
existence of a rule of recognition at the time of the writing of the book, he in fact was blind to the 
operation of a rule of recognition that crystalized significantly earlier than the time of writing his 
book, and which can still be identified today as the foundation of international law, although in a 
more complex form. 
The necessity of a rule of recognition for primary rules is simply that in any society 
individual subjects of the law and legal officials must be able to distinguish the legal rules of 
their own society from those of other societies, and legal rules from social rules more generally 
or from rules of etiquette or morality. When in a conversation with my neighbor she says, ‘x is 
the law around here,’ I must be able to ascertain whether she is telling the truth or making up the 
                                                            
39 Hart, 213. 
40 Waldron, “International Law: A ‘Relatively Small and Unimportant’ Part of Jurisprudence?” 217, 220-222, 
Payandeh, “The Concept of International Law” 989-990. 
41 Ibid, 236 (emphasis mine). 
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existence of a legal rule. In simple, customary legal system, to my subsequent question ‘why is 
this the law?’ she may reply ‘because we have always done x this way,’ and in monarchical 
systems the reply may be ‘because King Rex says so.’ In the former case, by saying ‘because we 
have always done x this way,’ she has identified the rule of obedience to custom as the rule of 
recognition, while in the latter case the rule of recognition is the principle “whatever King Rex 
enacts as law is law.’ In legal orders with a long history, numerous legal rules and complex rules 
of recognition, such as the United States, to my question ‘why is this the law?’ my neighbor 
might reply ‘because it was enacted as a statute by the state legislature which gets its authority 
from the US constitution,’ or if this train of reasoning is unfamiliar to her, ‘you can ask a 
lawyer/judge/legal official, they may be able to explain,’ and the legal official will point to the 
chain of legal validity that starts with the United States’ constitution. The law’s subjects and 
officials (and sometimes only the latter), will be capable to ascertain the sources of law and the 
criteria of legal validity in any legal system. Therefore, the rule of recognition is a conceptual 
necessity, because it is implicit in the identification of primary rules. Most subjects and officials 
must be able to engage in this process of identification if law is to function as a set of general 
behavioral guidelines that apply to all.  
States need criteria for distinguishing international law from the law of other states, from 
the law of subunits of states, or from rules that are part of the morality of states without being 
proper law. France for example, needs to tell apart the rules of international treaties and 
international custom from its own rules, the rules of European Union, or the rules of the United 
Kingdom. Each of these different systems of law have a different status in France. Due to 
sovereign immunity, the legal rules of the UK will for the most part fail to have effect in 
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France.42 Due to France’s membership, the laws of the European Union will apply automatically 
with important exceptions, while with respect to international law only treaties that France has 
explicitly agreed to as well as most international customs have force and only in the manner 
accepted by France and prescribed by treaties and international legal institutions.  
To be able to make these distinctions, France will need to appeal to widely accepted 
criteria for identifying the sources of international law. International law is in the fortunate 
position of having some (but not all) of its most important sources identified explicitly in the 
United Nations Charter. Since its passing in 1945, Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice has been recognized almost unanimously as identifying the main sources of 
international law.43 Article 38 states that they are: 
 
‘a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.’  
 
The four sources of legal validity – treaties, customs, the principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations, and judicial decisions and the writings of legal experts  ̶  represent a list of 
sources that has assisted the subjects of international law (mostly states) and officials in 
                                                            
42 With the limited exception of the cases in which France enters into commercial agreements with other entities, 
and as part of the arbitration clause they agree that the laws of the UK govern the agreement. 
43 Besson, “Theorizing the Sources of International Law,” 181; Mehrdad Payandeh, “The Concept of International 
Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart,” 989–90. 
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international institutions, permanent and ad hoc international tribunals, mediation and arbitration 
courts prior to and after the passing of the UN Charter.  
That custom and treaties have long been identified as sources of law is evident in the way 
disputes were settled prior to 1945. Its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(1922-1946) dealt with 29 cases and 27 advisory opinions in its brief life.44 Even at that time, 
courts relied on a body of customary and treaty rules, and on the practices and principles of 
developed legal system in making their decisions. In a book describing the work of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice published by the court in 1939 (and reissued by the ICJ 
in 2012), the sources of the law applied by the court are described as follows:  
 
‘The Court bases its decisions firstly upon international conventions, in so far as they 
establish rules expressly recognized by the litigant States or by the States directly 
interested in the question submitted; secondly, on international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law; and thirdly, on the general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations. The Court may also take into account judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, but only as a 
subsidiary means for determining rules of law.’45 
 
The UN Charter made these sources explicit. Today we are able to identify a more 
complex rule of recognition operating in international law that includes, in addition to Article 38, 
                                                            
44 Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1922-1946) http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/  (Accessed 
Oct. 24, 2016) 
45 The Permanent Court of International Justice: its Constitution and Work. Trilingual book (English, Spanish, 
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the whole of the UN Charter, including Article 103, which states that in case of conflict between 
members' obligations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international 
agreements, the Charter obligations shall prevail, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
legal principles and interpretive maxims that identify the prevailing law when rules or treaties 
conflict (such as lex specialis and lex posterior), some of the writing of the International Law 
Commissions, and many others.46 The existence of all of these different rules operating at the 
same time does not mean that there are multiple rules of recognition and different officials 
recognize different rules. If this were the case, the international legal system would lack the unity 
required of a legal system. But in fact, even if there is some uncertainty, international lawyers 
recognize the same rules as part of a hierarchy of rules of validity and interpretation. In his 
admirable book on the relationship of WTO law with general international law, Joost Pauwelyn 
shows that despite the possibility of conflict between different sources of international law due to 
the decentralized, fragmented nature in which different legal regimes were created, legal 
practitioners resort to a common toolbox of rules, principles and interpretative maxims to create 
coherence and unity.47 In this respect international law is not so different from domestic legal 
systems such as the United States in which a highly elaborate and multi-dimensional rule of 
recognition operates.48  
Therefore, Hart was wrong to deny the existence and necessity of a rule of recognition in 
international law, given its extensive development and application, particularly during the 20th 
                                                            
46 Lex specialis derogat lege generali-special law takes priority over general law. Treaty law is lex specialis (special 
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no derogation is permitted, then treaties supersede general law. Lex posterior derogate legi priori means that more 
recent law prevails over earlier law. 
47 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of 
International Law, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 89–153, 237–75. 




century. Waldron and Payandeh have revealed the inadequacy of Hart empirical thesis with 
regard to international law. But they have Hart’s failure to identify a rule of recognition in 
international law as evidence that Hart was wrong to deny international law the status of a legal 
system.49 Indeed, this is part of an emerging consensus on the interpretation of Hart’s view. 
Discussing Hart’s view that there is no rule of recognition, and therefore no international legal 
system, Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas write:  
 
“While such a reductive view of international law may have been factually correct in 
1961, it no longer is. General international law has internal rules that determine its own 
validity and may therefore be deemed an autonomous legal order, and this is true of 
international conventional law as much as of customary law.”50 
 
In contrast, my reconstruction of Hart’s ‘necessary and sufficient’ criteria points to 
additional reasons to question the identification of international law with a legal system. Recall 
that the list contains a translation of Hart’s ‘two minimum conditions’ into eight (or nine, 
depending on how you count), and a further three conditions that Hart discusses as essential but 
fails to explicitly include into his definition of law. The first eight are 1. the existence of primary 
rules, which 2. are habitually obeyed by the population, and 3. the existence of rules of 
recognition, 4. rules of change, and 5. rules of adjudication, which 6. are accepted as common 
public standards by public officials, 7. that there exist courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and 8. 
that there are rule-making and rule-changing bodies. The further three conditions that 
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Payandeh, “The Concept of International Law” 989-990. 
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characterize all legal systems are 9. the generality of the rules both in terms of their content and 
range of applicability (to all the subjects within a given territory), 10. the presence of rules 
distinguished by their content, i.e. that criminalize certain types of behavior injurious to 
individual life and liberty and to the social life of the community, and 11. the presence of 
centralized coercive punishment as a response to rule violation.  
While I will not be able to discuss any in detail how these criteria apply to international 
law, this list can launch a productive discussion of what it might mean for international law 
count as a legal system according to a reconstructed Hartian account of law. We can start to look 
backwards from the last condition, that of the necessity of centralized enforcement. In this case, 
as in others, Hart’s statements are ambivalent and confusing. On the one hand, he seems to grant 
to the critics of international law that the fact that it lacks a legislature, courts with compulsory 
jurisdiction, and centralized enforcement, which features render international law more akin to 
primitive law than developed legal systems.51 This is because Hart equates the lack of legislature 
and compulsory jurisdiction with the absence of rules of change and adjudication, and the lack of 
centralized enforcement with the ineffectiveness of the rules.52  
On the other hand, and despite his insistence that centralized enforcement is necessary for 
law to be effective in general, Hart rejects the idea that centralized international sanctions are 
needed. He insists that international law can create obligations for its subjects – states – that 
make certain conduct mandatory, even in the absence of sanctions. To believe sanctions are 
necessary would be to take the intuitive but distorting picture of law as orders backed by threats 
as the yardstick by which to measure law-worthiness. The differences between states and 
individuals are such that in international law sanctions are not necessary to the same extent and 
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they cannot be used as safely and efficaciously as they would be in municipal law. States differ 
in their strength more than individuals do, the prospects of success against an offending state are 
much smaller, even when groups of states rally against a bigger state, and the risks and likely 
costs much higher for all parties involved.53 Hart’s view that sanctions are not necessary in 
international law does not square with his earlier insistence that centralized enforcement is a 
necessary feature of law.54 I believe Hart’s initial implicit reliance on coercion as a necessary 
feature of any legal system was right, because I am persuaded by his insistence that it is one of 
the features that distinguishes law from other systems of social rules or from morality more 
generally. While Hart was right that coercive punishment at the international level raises 
important concerns, he was wrong to dismiss it as counterproductive and unnecessary. While I 
do not have the space to defend this point here, suffices to say that any credible set of rules 
prohibiting certain behaviors especially injurious to large groups of individuals and the 
international community as a whole would be authoritative and effective without coercive 
enforcement.    
How does international law do on the other implicit and explicit criteria of his concept of 
law? Rules of change plainly exist in international law, since states make new treaties and revise 
old ones constantly. For example, at the GATT/World Trade Organization, rules regulating 
international trade have gone through numerous rounds of negotiations, each lasting many years, 
during which member countries both expanded the number of areas covered by regulations to 
issues such as services and intellectual property, and reviewed and changed old areas of 
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regulation covering trade in manufactured goods, industrial products, and textiles. The United 
Nations, although it does not act as a legislature, has fostered the creation of many new 
international agreements. One of the most important legal measure adopted by the UN members 
was the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), 
which led to the creation of many new independent states and to the dramatic increase in the 
number of UN members. Among thousands of other countless treaties, a few stand out: the 
creation of the new International Criminal Court (2002), the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (1982), and the United Nations Convention Framework on Climate Change, the last of 
which went though many rounds of amendments and renegotiations, the last being the Paris 
Agreement of December 2015. That new treaties are created all the time and old treaties are 
superseded is proof that rules of change operate in international law. 
Some of these rules of change were formalized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT 1980). The VCLT applies only to treaties made by states and explains how 
treaties are made, enter into force, are changed, terminated, or become invalid. The VCLT has 
crystalized and developed key practices in customary law related to the negotiating and making 
of treaties among states. Additional rules of change and interpretive maxims such as lex specialis 
(special law supersedes general law) and lex posterior (more recent law supersedes older law) 
are deployed precisely because under conditions of constant change, an order of precedence 
between old and new agreements must be established to avoid confusion about what the law 
requires on a particular issue.  
Hart could not foresee the development of VCLT, but the existence of customary rules of 
change was implicit in the effervescence around the creation of new international treaties in the 
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1950s. Therefore, Hart was not on solid ground to deny the existence of rules of change. The fact 
that he ties the existence of a rule of change to the presence of a legislature offers a clue into his 
reasoning. Hart believed that since international law lacks a legislature, it must lack rules of 
change. But as Waldron and Payandeh have also shown, there is no necessary connection 
between centralized law-making and law-changing institutions and rules of change.55 While the 
UN acts as a facilitator, much of international law is made in a decentralized fashion by large 
groups of independent states acting jointly to resolve common problems. One possible 
explanation of Hart’s error is that he associated the idea of a legal system too closely with the 
centralized law-making institutions of a modern state, leading him to look for its vestiges as 
markers of legal systems elsewhere.56 International law clearly contains general rules of change 
in the VCLT and in specific areas and law-making institutions such as the WTO. 
When it comes to rules of adjudication, the assessment of international law becomes 
more complicated. Part of the problem is that Hart did not specify what counts as an adequate 
rule of adjudication.57 But one criterion he did attached to rules of adjudication is courts with 
compulsory jurisdiction, which international law currently lacks. The fact that the judgments of 
the international Court of Justice are generally obeyed does not make up for the fact that states 
cannot be brought under its jurisdiction against their will, as Hart rightly points out.58 For those 
who want to show how similar international law as a legal system is with domestic law, Hart 
offers the sobering challenge that ‘whereas a municipal court has compulsory jurisdiction to 
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investigate the rights and wrongs of ‘self-help’ and to punish a wrongful resort to it, no 
international court has similar jurisdiction.’59  
Waldron denies the necessity of courts with compulsory jurisdiction. Referring to the rule 
of adjudication, he says that “it is not part of the abstract understanding of this kind of secondary 
rule, for example, that the institution in question must have compulsory jurisdiction.”60 But here 
is where Waldron believes he has pointed out an inconsistency, whereas he has merely identified 
an underexplored feature of Hart’s system that gives rise to a misunderstanding about what his 
account of law really demands. The necessity of courts with compulsory jurisdiction comes from 
Hart’s insistence that law contain general, non-optional primary rules of conduct, whose 
violations are ascertained finally and authoritatively by agents specially tasked for this purpose, 
and whose judgments are effective. Since in international law states cannot be brought before 
courts without their consent, many violations are neither authoritatively ascertained, nor 
challenged or punished. 
The absence of courts with compulsory jurisdiction was a feature of international law 
during the 1950s and it continues to be a feature today despite the proliferation of dispute 
resolution forums. The closest we have come to a court with compulsory jurisdiction is the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction applies to the citizens and officials of all 
member states, of states that have special agreements with the ICC, and of other states which are 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council. This extends the authority of the ICC potentially to 
cover all states, but given the indirect mechanism of referral, the lack of prosecutorial capacity to 
pursue the citizens and officials of non-member states and the capriciousness of the Security 
Council veto mechanism, the ICC cannot be said to enjoy compulsory universal jurisdiction yet.  
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Yet general rules of adjudication seem to be widely shared by officials in courts, tribunals 
and arbitration proceedings in international law. The Fragmentation Study commissioned by the 
UN from the International Law Commission details principles and maxims that are widely used 
to interpret international rules and solve conflicts between rules arising in different areas of 
international law, such as considering a particular area of law in light of general international 
law, relying on precedent, and so on.61 These count as rules of adjudication, namely rules that 
enable officials to discern and pass judgment on violations of primary rules. 
But the main difficulty resides in the insufficiently precise notion of obedience. One of 
the main feature of a legal system is the primary rules of obligation are widely obeyed by ‘most 
of the people most of the time.’  Hart does not elaborate on what this means as an evaluative 
criterion, giving the less helpful explanation that obedience is like baldness. Just as it is not 
possible to say precisely the point at which a person becomes bald, so it is difficult to say 
precisely when a system changes from the absence of widespread obedience to its presence.62 
But this leaves us few resources to assess the extent of compliance or answer those who might 
contest the fact that the rules of international law are widely accepted and obeyed.  
Therefore, on the first six criteria I have identified above as conditions for the existence 
of a legal system, namely 1. the existence of primary rules, which 2. are habitually obeyed by the 
population; 3. the existence of a rule of recognition, 4. rules of change, and 5. rules of 
adjudication, which 6. are accepted as common public standards by public officials, we can say 
the following. Conditions 1,3,4,5, and 6 are met. We are unable to assess whether international 
law meets condition 2, and the most we can say is that it is possible that it does. Condition 7. that 
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Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” 2006, 115–205, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/CN.4/L.682. 
62 Hart, The Concept of Law, 56. 
31 
 
the courts must have universal jurisdiction, is not met, and 8. that there exist legislative bodies is 
met, even though it does not take the form of a legislature familiar from domestic legal system, 
but rather of decentralized law-making consisting mainly in groups of states. 
Understanding the complexity of Hart’s criteria enables us to better understand his 
concern for the lack of rules of adjudication in international law, and that they cannot be as easily 
dismissed as Payandeh does. Payandeh claims that since Hart wrongly denied that international 
law contains a system of adjudication, we can reject his concern as unfounded.63 However, 
understanding the multidimensional account of what Hart means by a system of adjudication, 
which includes rules of settling disputes as well as courts with universal jurisdiction which are 
effective in inducing states to comply with their decisions, allows us to acknowledge that some 
of his concerns are real and have not be addressed at this point in the evolution of international 
law. 
On the subsequent formal and substantive criteria for primary rules, namely that primary 
rules must be 9. general in terms of their content and range of applicability (to all the subjects 
within a given territory), 10. criminalize certain types of behavior injurious to individual life and 
liberty and to the social life of the community, and 11. be backed by the presence of centralized 
coercive punishment as a response to rule violation, we can assert the following. Condition 9 is 
met because customary rules as well as the UN Charter apply generally. The UN Charter 
contains general prohibitions on the use of force and for the protection of territorial sovereignty, 
while customary humanitarian law contains restrictions on the use of violence in war. Condition 
10 is not met, since general rules of criminal law limiting what states do to each other and their 
own citizens are fairly weak, do not come attach to sanctions and do not apply to all states. The 
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important exception here is jus cogens norms, which describe general principles of international 
law such as prohibitions against slavery, genocide, and crimes against humanity, from which no 
derogation is ever allowed. But international courts have made it clear that in most cases, state 
immunity trumps jus cogens, and therefore the latter lack the universally binding character that 
its proponents believe it should have. 64 Condition 11 is obviously not met, and one must agree 
with Hart that the presence of the Security Council does not qualify as a general enforcement 
mechanism, since the Security Council authority is limited to the UN Charter (or a subset of it), 
and there is much more international law besides it that lacks centralized enforcement, including 
international criminal law.  
To sum up, of the 11 formal and substantive conditions, seven (1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,) are 
met, one (2) leaves room for considerable uncertainty, and three (7, 10, 11) are clearly not met. 
What practical and theoretical implications can we draw from this exercise? Given the 
shortcoming of international law in meeting the criteria that are part of this expanded 
understanding of law, we must conclude that Hart was ultimately right in his judgment that 
international law does not meet the conditions of a legal system. But he was likely wrong that 
therefore it is merely a primitive legal system. International law exhibited secondary rules of 
significant complexity even during Hart’s time, including an ultimate rule of recognition, despite 
failing to develop certain parts the complex institutional machinery to make those rules effective. 
This exercise of evaluating the nature of international law is important, because, at the very least, 
looking at Hart’s view through this new lens helps us see that international law is much closer to 
fulfilling Hart’s union of primary and secondary rules test. It displays secondary rules of 
recognition, change, and adjudication, (even if imperfectly), and does therefore contain a high 
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degree of systematicity and institutionalization, but it does not meet other important conditions 
that Hart himself highlighted in various parts of the book but did not make explicit in his 
definition. We are led to question, with Michael Giudice, the very distinction between primitive 
law and fully developed legal systems that serves for Hart as the basis for the identification and 




Hart’s view of the law contains a plausible and widely adopted characterization of the 
necessary and sufficient features of a legal system.66 Yet Hart obscured the significant 
complexity of his criteria. The purpose of this argument was to bring to light numerous features 
of Hart’s view that he left in the background. I have translated ‘minimal conditions’ for the 
existence of a legal system, and I proceeded to assess the nature of international law through the 
prism of this new account of law. Understanding the ways in which international law falls short 
of meeting these criteria endorses Hart’s conclusion that international law is immature, but not 
for the reasons he gave and not to the extent that he argued. If international law is not quite a 
mature legal system, it has long moved beyond a primitive legal order towards a sophisticated set 
of secondary rules and institutions entrusted with their interpretation and application.  
The analysis developed here turns a mirror on Hart’s own view.  It places into sharper 
relief the complexity, vagueness, and limitations of some of the criteria he uses, such as 
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widespread obedience, or the existence of general and mandatory rules, which turn out to be 
important for the evaluation of international law. The argument offered here has reinforced what 
Hart always suspected but failed to articulate persuasively: that international law raises 
significant challenges to our understanding of law based mostly on the model of centralized 
states and it invites us to re-imagine the conceptual map that best capture the nature of law. 
 
